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NOTES IN DEFENSE OF THE IRAQ CONSTITUTION
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI*
1.

ON THE NECESSITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

This paper is a defense of sorts of the Iraqi constitution,
arguing that the language used in it was wisely designed to allow
some level of flexibility, such that the constitution could evolve as
social and political circumstances necessitated. The point is more
than a theoretical one.
Enormous changes in the political
landscape and understandings of popular will have occurred, and
due to the flexibility of the language, the Constitution has not only
survived them, but has had its own legitimacy considerably broadened
as a result.
Such thoughts seem tantamount to a form of academic heresy.
Offering kind words on the Iraq constitution is not often done in
our current academic and media environment. From its very
inception, the constitution has been dismissed as shamelessly
imposed upon an unwilling identitarian community—the Arab
Sunnis—1 conceived in a “veritable pathology of legality”2 and
likely to bring about, as the title of one work put it, “The End of
Iraq.”3 The latter view in particular has been all but proven
demonstrably wrong: Iraq’s Constitution has passed its half decade
mark, and Iraq is, by all accounts, far more secure, centralized, and
confident in its position as a nation state than it was when the
Constitution was drafted. Ethnic and sectarian violence no longer
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. The
author would like to thank Michael Dorf, Jules Lobel, George Taylor, and the
participants in the Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan for
their helpful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to my research assistant,
Eryn Correa, without whose assistance this Article would never have been
completed on schedule.
1 Feisal Istrabadi, A Constitution without Constitutionalism: Reflections on Iraq’s
Failed Constitutional Process, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1628–29 (2008).
2 Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution Making and Its Pathology in Iraq,
51 N.Y.L.S. REV. 535, 551 (2007).
3 See PETER GALBRAITH, THE END OF IRAQ 206 (2006) (indicating that there will
be “little reason to mourn Iraq’s passing”).
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reigns on Iraq’s streets as they once did.4 Foreign investment has
become less of a theoretical possibility and more of an emerging
reality.5 All identitarian communities participate fully in electoral
events, the threat of boycotts seems to have disappeared entirely.6
Despite these several not insignificant gains,7 characterizations
of the Constitution that served as the founding document of the
nation during the relevant period have hardly grown any more
charitable. Through my participation at the September 2010
Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School (“Penn Conference”), I
heard denunciations of provisions of the Constitution that might in
some but not all cases be characterized as strident. Had they been
made by those ignorant of Iraq’s history, law, or politics, they
might well be disregarded. When made, as they were, by
individuals whose knowledge of and dedication to Iraq, over the
course of decades in some cases, has been nothing short of
remarkable, I feel compelled to stake my ground, offering the bases
my respectful dissent from the groupthink with care and due
reverence for their considerable achievements although their views
do not accord with my own.
From Jason Gluck, I learned that the Constitution’s flaws
include an inability of the central government to tax,8 a point
4 Sam Dagher, Iraqis Face Uncertain Future as U.S. Ends Combat Mission, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704913
704575453303215595156.html.
5 Zainab Fattah, Lafarge to Raise Iraq Cement Capacity by 2 million tons by 2013,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 30, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-30
/lafarge-to-raise-iraq-cement-capacity-by-2-million-tons-by-2013.html.
6 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Iraqi Sunni Leaders Urge Participation in
Next Election, GLOBAL SECURITY, July 14, 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int
/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVIU-6EAH27?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc=irq;
Anthony Shadid, Sunnis go to Polls, This Time, to Retain a Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/world
/middleeast/08sunnis.html.
7 To be clear, I do not deny and acknowledge as valid any criticism that Iraq
continues to suffer from problems ranging from appalling infrastructure to
endemic levels of corruption that border on the pathological. My point, however,
is that on balance, Iraq has seen its fortunes improve under this Constitution.
8 Jason Gluck, Sr. Rule of Law Adv., U.S Inst. of Peace, at the University of
Pennsylvania Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sept.
24, 2010) [hereinafter Gluck Remarks]. Gluck has since clarified in a conversation
with me, indicating that while the central government might have the power to
tax, fully formed regions could freely overrule such legislation in a manner
described subsequently, and that this would starve the central government of
resources should regions additional to Kurdistan be formed. My own view, as
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repeated by Rend Al-Rahim.9 Al-Rahim and Ambassador Feisal
Istrabadi seemed exercised about the broad powers of Iraq’s
provinces vis-à-vis the central government in Baghdad.10 AlRahim and Gluck both mentioned the danger that Iraq’s existing
provinces might become near independent regions as permitted by
the Constitution.11
The young, energetic and intellectually
formidable Sabah Al-Bawi, the Head of the Division of Legislative
Drafting at the Council of Representative’s Research Directorate,
while far more sanguine respecting the Constitution, criticized the
vagueness of some of its provisions, and hoped that amendments
might provide further clarity.12
Throughout the learned and well-considered remarks, one
theme was preponderant: the Constitution required amendment,
sooner rather than later, or danger loomed, primarily in the form of
national division. We could well have been in 2005, listening to the
prognostications on the imminent “End of Iraq” described above.
Somehow, despite all good that has transpired in terms of security
gains and broad electoral participation—undertaken under the rule
of the current Constitution—the prevailing belief seems to be that
the founding document still places the nation on the precipice of
national disaster, and amendment is the only cure.
Misguided as I believe them to be, the abovementioned views
of Al-Rahim, Gluck, Istrabadi and Al-Bawi are based on some set
of acknowledged fact, as indeed they would have to be to emanate
from such keen and knowledgeable minds. The problem is not
that these erudite scholars and activists are unaware of the changes
that have taken place within Iraq over the past several years—each
of them is admittedly passionately and admirably dedicated to Iraq
and its progress. The problem is their implicit adoption of a rigid
and formalistic model of legal and constitutional change, wherein
described in the main text, is that the possibility of region formation is sufficiently
remote that this need not be considered a present danger.
9 Rend Al-Rahim, Exec. Dir., Iraq Found., at the University of Pennsylvania
Conference on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq and Afghanistan (Sept. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Al-Rahim Remarks].
10 Id; Amb. Feisal Amin Rasoul Istrabadi, Univ. Scholar in Int’l Law &
Diplomacy and Dir., Ctr. for the Study of the Middle East, Maurer School of Law,
Indiana University (Bloomington) (Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Istrabadi Remarks].
11 Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9; Gluck Remarks, supra note 8.
12 Dr. Sabah Al-Bawi, Head, Div. of Legislative Drafting, Res. Directorate of
the Council of Representatives Iraq, at the University of Pennsylvania Conference
on Rule of Law Reform in Iraq & Afghanistan (Sept. 24, 2010).
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constitutional language necessarily dictates one possible set of
outcomes, that which is commonly attached to it at drafting, and
wherein any change subsequent thereto must be achieved by
formal amendment. The only exception, it seems, is where, as Dr.
Al-Bawi put it, the text itself is poorly drafted, or “vague,”13 a flaw
that likewise requires correction through formal amendment.
This model would be subject to rather serious challenge if
applied in the American context. Recent work has tended to
emphasize the importance of constitutional change without formal
amendment. I might begin with Bruce Ackerman’s well-known
analysis of American constitutional history, arguing that
constitutional meaning is shifting profoundly, even in the absence
of formal amendment, during certain seminal “constitutional
moments.”14 More recent work has tended to downplay the notion
of change during particular periods, providing in its place a
narrative of continual evolution of constitutional meaning. Barry
Friedman’s formidable The Will of the People is a broad history of
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, which demonstrates
that Supreme Court opinion tracks the popular will as concerns
constitutional meaning.15 There are even originalists, albeit less
orthodox ones, who emphasize the possibility of constitutional
change within the limits of what the semantic content of the words
might offer. Most compellingly to this author, Jack Balkin has
famously suggested that while the constitution’s words, in their
original meaning, necessarily provide a constraint on future
legislative action, the original expected application of the founders is
not necessarily binding.16 Thus, for example, the right to an
Id.
See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44–50 (1991).
15 BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 9
(Ill. ed. 2009).
16 Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 549, 552 (2009). A similar distinction was also advanced earlier by Mark
Greenberg and Harry Litman between “original meaning” and “original
expectation.” Mark Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning,
86 GEO. L. J. 569, 573–74 (1998). More broadly, Balkin’s work draws on the
considerable achievements of such luminaries as Randy Barnett, Larry Solum, and
Keith Whittington. See Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, Not the
Constitution in Exile, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 669 (2004); Larry Solum, Incorporation and
Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 409 (2009); Keith Whittington,
Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010).
Another important early adopter of a similar approach, and one who, like this
author, sought to reconcile the monumental insights of American Legal Realism
13
14
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abortion might well be defended on originalist grounds as being
necessitated by the equality provisions of the Constitution, even if
the drafters would not have expected such a result.17 The changing
applications derive from the ability of political and social
movements (more specifically, the feminist movement, in the case
of the right to an abortion) to change understandings of how
particular provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment may
ultimately be applied.18 The semantic meaning of the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not thus change, only its expected
application.19 More broadly, I would maintain that this semantic
constraint combined with a capacity for change has worked well in
the American context, permitting the constitution to remain
relevant to the very legal and political system it is supposed to
limit. The same might be said of Iraq inasmuch as the various
manifestations of federalism, criticized above as being improperly
handled by the Iraqi Constitution, are concerned.
In questions following my own remarks outlining these ideas
at the Penn Conference, Al-Rahim criticized my somewhat liberal
use of comparative methodologies to describe the Iraq constitution.
She suggested that there lies a chasm of difference between a state
with two hundred years of constitutional history and a deeply
venerated judiciary with a constitutional state barely that is barely
half a decade old whose judiciary is comparatively untested. I
might reply by suggesting that her characterization of the
American judiciary is, at least as a historical matter, more
sympathetic than is warranted, even as her characterization of the
Iraqi judiciary is more critical than I would accept. Nonetheless,
this is not in fact the meat of the matter, as Rahim is surely correct
that America’s judiciary is more deeply venerated than Iraq’s, and
enjoys considerable historical respect that is absent in the Iraqi
context.20 The more central, and fatal, problem with Al-Rahim’s
with interpretive constraints offered by original understanding, was Robert
Clinton. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of ‘This Constitution’, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1265 (1987).
17 Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMM. 291, 319–21
(2007).
18 Id. at 321.
19 Id. at 322.
20 I have explored these ideas at length in a draft article soon to be published
in the Utah Law Review. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Will of the (Iraqi) People,
2011 UTAH L. REV. 45–61 (2011), available at http://epubs.utah.edu/index.php
/ulr/article/view/543/404.
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objection is that the need for constitutional flexibility exists
irrespective of the strength of the judiciary or the history of the
constitutional state. Whether a nation’s judiciary is weak or strong,
and whether its constitution is two centuries old or has lasted
barely six years, social and political changes occur, and require
language sufficiently capacious to address them.
Empirical research seems to bear out this conclusion. The
remarkable work by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton on the
endurance of national constitutions has shown that flexibility is
one of three central factors in determining constitutional
longevity.21 Their work encompasses nearly all national constitutions
written since 1789, which would include necessarily weak states
and strong ones, those with comparatively powerful judiciaries
and those whose judges are incapable of confronting the state.22
Yet, overall, the authors conclude that the more flexible
constitutions endured.
The conclusion, empirically supported as it is, appears logical
enough. To use as an example a matter of some debate within
Iraqi society about which I will have precious little to say in these
pages, the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam and the state are
wisely flexible in their drafting. They neither require all law to
conform to the dictates of shari’a as determined exclusively by a
council of scholars, as some Islamist groups would have
preferred,23 nor do they suggest the absence of any role for Islam in
legislation, as is the preference of others (Ambassador Istrabadi
included on the basis of his own remarks at the Penn
Conference).24 Rather, the provisions indicate that Islam is a
“foundational source” of legislation, that no law may be enacted
that violates the “settled rulings” of Islam or the rights and
freedoms set forth in the Constitution, and that the state has some
responsibility to “guarantee the protection” of the Muslim identity
of the majority of Iraq’s citizens.25
21

(2009).

ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 81–82

See id. at ix.
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Ornamental Repugnancy: Identitarian Islam and the
Iraqi Constitution, 8 ST. THOM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698447&download=yes,
at 8.
24 Istrabadi Remarks, supra note 10.
25 Article 2, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005. There are other provisions of the Constitution that involve Islam
22
23
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Leaving aside how the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam
and the state have evolved, the language is capacious enough to
accommodate the positions of both Ambassador Istrabadi and the
more religious of Iraq’s political elites given the elasticity of
phrases such as “settled rulings”, “protection” of Muslim identity
and “foundational source.” The language could mean nothing
more than some form of robust free exercise, prohibiting the state
from enacting laws banning the headscarf, for example, a
conclusion I cannot imagine any secularists interested in a political
future in Iraq would find controversial in the slightest. On the
other hand, it could mean active and engaged shari’a review by a
court with some juristic influence. The matter of constitutional
construction on the basis of this framework text is left to those
succeeding the drafters.
Imagine, however, if such flexibility were absent—if, that is to
say, on account of Al-Rahim’s genuine concern on the state of the
Iraqi judiciary or the weakness of the rising Iraqi state, we were to
demand amendment of these provisions of the Iraq constitution to
provide greater clarity on the issue of Islam and its interaction with
the state. It seems to me that there would be one of two possible
results. In the first possibility the constitution would be subject to
such frequent amendment based on who happened to win the
previous set of elections that its role as a unifying fundamental
bargain would be destroyed. It is true that the secularist parties
performed quite well in the national elections held in 2010, though
some Islamist parties, notably the Sadrists, managed quite well to
hold their own.26 It would be dangerously naïve to suggest that
using this electoral momentum to demand further changes to the

and the state, most famously Article 41, which relates to matters of family law.
Article 41, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005. It is not my purpose to provide in this brief aside a comprehensive review
of the relevant provisions of Iraq’s constitution as they concern Islam and the state
and what they might mean in terms of future construction. This I leave to an
upcoming book I am writing on the Iraq Constitution to be published with the
University of Chicago Press. Rather, I focus on the general (and extensively
negotiated) provisions of Article 2 as an example of capacious language from
which various constructions might be drawn.
26 Rania El Gamal & Muhanad Mohammed, Iraq’s Allawi Says Open to All in
Coalition Talks, REUTERS, Mar. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com
/article/idUSTRE62P42T20100327; Anthony Shadid, Followers of Sadr Emerge
Stronger After Iraq Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010 /03/17/world/middleeast/17sadr.html?_r=2.
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Iraq constitution in the direction of secularization27 would not
inspire Islamist resistance and determination to reverse such
changes in the future. Assuming, that is, Islamist parties enjoy a
future resurgence, a matter I consider a near certainty for no reason
other than that cyclical politics are what they are, and one must
assume the fortunes of competing political movements will rise
and fall as they have over the past decade in Iraq. However, given
the rather onerous amendment rules of the Iraq constitution,28
frequent amendment is unlikely.
The second possible result of demanding near absolute
precision from the Iraqi constitution’s provisions on Islam and the
state would be some form of semi-permanent impasse respecting
the role of religion in the state. An impasse is likely because
permanent agreement is not possible. In fact, some have decried,
for good enough reason in certain contexts, the seeming
unwillingness of Iraq’s political elites to reach much by way of
compromise on any number of questions.29 Thus, the idea that
Iraq’s political forces would come together on a matter of such
historic contention as religion and the state to the extent necessary
to draft language that is not capacious, not capable of developing
various constructions within the confines of flexible framework
text, seems wildly unrealistic.
Our own national debates
respecting the role of religion in the state should amply
demonstrate the sensitivities and controversies engendered by
such matters. Flexibility, it seems, is the only route available to
27 Technically, Article 126(2) prohibits changes to Article 2 until two electoral
cycles have passed, which would not occur until the year 2014. Article 126 § 2,
Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. My
point, however, does not relate to the precise date that amendment might first be
initiated, but rather the costs associated with attempted frequent amendment to
what is supposed to be a permanent, consensual compact.
28 The regular amendment procedures set forth in Article 126 of the Iraq
Constitution require a two thirds vote of the Council of Representatives and
approval of a majority of those voting in a general referendum. Article 126,
Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
There are special onetime amendment procedures set forth in Article 142 which
are less cumbersome, but these procedures are not relevant for these purposes,
first, because they may only be used once, and second, they must be used within
the first session of the Council of Representatives, which has already ended.
Article 142, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq]
of 2005.
29 See, e.g., ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION 226–
27 (2009) (describing the collapse of multi-party negotiations during the
constitutional drafting process).
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ensure broad and lasting fidelity to constitutional text on the part
of rising and falling political movements.
Yet while Islam and the state might well be a salient example of
the need for constitutional flexibility, none of the formidable critics,
with whom I had the pleasure of a fruitful engagement at the Penn
Conference, engaged this particular matter in much detail. Even
Ambassador Istrabadi’s comments on the role of shari’a came in
response to a question from an audience member. Rather, the
panelists’ real concerns, and the related demands for clarity, arose
out of the federalism provisions of the Iraq constitution.
Specifically, the core issues were the central government’s powers,
the powers of the provinces, and the ability of provinces to turn
themselves into semi-autonomous regions.
In sharp
contradistinction to my colleagues, I find these particular
provisions, for the most part and with one significant exception set
forth below, well-drafted and commendable in their use of
capacious language that establishes a sensible framework upon
which future construction might be built.
I therefore take up the challenge implicit in the broad criticisms
made at the Penn Conference. Specifically, I shall demonstrate first
that the constitutional language is more flexible than the critics
maintain, and is capable of alternative readings that are more
centralist in their nature; second, that such alternative readings have
been operationally deployed, meaning they are the very
constructions that Iraqi decision makers have developed in
practice, and third, that this has helped to bring about a broad and
lasting consensus that was heretofore absent. Put differently, the
Iraqi constitution may have not originated as a consensual
document but was cleverly designed so as to evolve into one, and
it has so evolved.
Part Two of this Paper introduces the relevant constitutional
provisions, outlines the expectations of the drafting parties, and
suggests alternative readings that are entirely plausible on the
basis of the text. Part Three demonstrates how those alternative
approaches came to be employed, largely because popular will
demanded them. Part Four notes precisely why in light of this,
formal amendment to address these particular matters would
probably be a mistake. Part Five concludes on a note of
concession, and re-characterizes the dispute between my
colleagues and me as not so much strict formalism on their part,
nor unqualified anti-formalism on mine, but rather the relative

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

HAMOUDI_POSTCONVERSION.DOC

1286

10/6/2011 1:02 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 32:5

emphasis each of us tends to place on the extent and importance of
flexibility in constitutional provisions.
2.

FEDERALISM AS FRAMEWORK TEXT

2.1. The Power to Tax
Among the most frequent criticisms of the Iraq Constitution is
that it grants the central government far too limited power in
Article 110 of the Constitution.30 To use the most salient example,
the central government, it is frequently maintained, does not even
have the power to tax.31
What self-respecting sovereign
government in the modern world, the point seems to be, cannot
even raise revenue to finance its own activities?
A review of the negotiating history of Article 110, which lists
the central government’s enumerated powers, could certainly
support this conclusion.32 The debate lay largely between, on the
one hand, Kurdish negotiators and some of the more federalist
Shi’a parties within the broader Shi’a Coalition, most notably the
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (“ISCI”) and, on the other, more
centralist Shi’a, most notably Da’wa and the Sadrists, along with,
when they were part of the negotiating process, the Sunni
representatives.33 The Kurds and federalist Shi’a argued that the
Article 110, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005.
31 Gluck Remarks, supra note 8; Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9.
As
described subsequently in the text, this is a position also adopted by Peter
Galbraith, an adviser to the Kurds during constitutional negotiations. GALBRAITH,
supra note 3, at 199.
32 See Notes on Iraqi Constitutional Negotiation Documents (Jan. 25, 2010)
(on file with the author) [hereinafter Constitutional Notes] (recounting the
contents of the constitutional negotiation documents in the possession of Sh.
Humam Hamoudi, the author’s paternal uncle and the chair of the constitutional
drafting committee, appointed by Iraq’s interim legislature at the time, the
Transitional National Assembly). The Constitutional Notes are cited in lieu of the
actual constitutional negotiation documents due to conditions of access placed on
the author.
33 The positions of the various parties toward a federal arrangement for Iraq
are well documented. See ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 409 (2007)
(providing a carefully and thoughtfully rendered review of the Sunni position);
GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 165–67 (describing the Kurdish position in some
detail); Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1647–48 (providing excellent background on the
fissures within the Shi’a coalition on the subject). As Allawi reports, Sunni
involvement in constitutional drafting was late in coming, and ultimately the
Sunnis rejected the final product although it was imposed upon them anyway. Id.
at 405, 415.
30
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enumerated powers should be limited by adding the term “hasran”
or (as they understood it) “solely” to the end of the introductory
phrase “The central government shall exercise the following
competencies,” meaning that the enumerated powers that followed
the introductory phrase would then be the sole powers of the
central government.34 The centralists wanted, in the words of one
negotiator, to list particular powers, but not to limit the central
government solely to the exercise of those powers.35 In the end, the
federalists succeeded in describing the powers of the central
government as “al-sultat al-hasriya,” or the limited powers, and
they are indeed extraordinarily narrow and do not include, at least
explicitly, a power to tax.36
Yet a more careful linguistic analysis plainly makes another
reading plausible from the framework text. The term hasriya, from
the Arabic hasara, meaning to encircle, encompass or surround,37
could as easily mean “exclusive” as it does “limited.” It is
frequently so used in modern Arabic, to describe an “exclusive
interview” on an Arabic language satellite channel, for example, as
any Arabic speaker familiar with Arabic television programming
(myself included) would know the term to mean “exclusive.” This
interpretation suggests that the central government powers
described in Article 110 are exclusive but not limited, meaning that
sub-national units may not legislate as to the exclusive areas, but
the jurisdiction is concurrent as to matters beyond those contained
in Article 110.
It should be noted that this reading was not unnoticed even by
commentators at the time.
While Galbraith maintained
contemporaneously that the document was clear in containing no
power to tax, and indeed credits his own “quick thinking” abilities
as helping to ensure this result,38 Deeks and Burton, perhaps in a
less “quick thinking” fashion, but certainly giving the matter more
careful, rigorous and engaged thought, pointed out the alternative

Constitutional Notes, supra note 32.
Id.
36 See Article 110, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (lacking any mention of taxation in the enumerated
powers of the federal government).
37 THE HANS WEHR DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 212 (J.M. Cowan
ed., 4th ed. 1994).
38 GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 199.
34
35
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possibility, and provide a rather persuasive textual basis for that
alternative.39
It is fair to ask why the ambiguity was allowed to remain when
the drafters could have easily foreclosed any argument respecting
residual federal power simply by adding a phrase explicitly
prohibiting the exercise of any jurisdiction beyond that specified in
Article 110 of the Constitution. While it is hard to know for certain,
the opposition of the centralist Shi’a to the more extreme federalist
vision of Iraq must have played a role. The possibility of later
placating the Sunni representatives, who ultimately abandoned the
constitutional negotiations, was in all likelihood in the drafters’
minds as well.40 Whatever the reason, it suffices to say that the
language is flexible and capable of at least two alternative
constructions, and that the matter was effectively left to resolution
at a later time.
2.2. Asymmetric Federalism
Whether at the Penn Conference or elsewhere, rare is the
objection to the fact of broad Kurdish autonomy, with most
disputes being over the borders of the Kurdish semi-autonomous
region rather than its existence.41 This seems natural enough, the
Kurds have enjoyed a state of de facto autonomy since 1991,42 and
the notion that meaningful central control could be exercised over
them without dramatic loss of life seems fanciful and dangerously
delusional.
As a result, what centralists decry in the context of Iraq’s
constitution is not so much the idea of federalism vis a vis the
Kurdish region, but rather a broader form of federalism that
encompasses any other part of Iraq.43 The resulting criticism of the
Iraq constitution from the Penn Conference, on the basis of the
remarks of Gluck, Al-Rahim and Istrabadi in particular, is thus
twofold. First, it grants far too much power to Iraq’s provinces.
Second, a particular concern of Gluck, it permits the provinces to
39 See Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting
History, 40 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 70–71 (2007) (discussing that the constitution
leaves many powers to “law” and inclusive in “law” will likely be “federal law”).
40 ARATO, supra note 29, at 227; ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 404–05, 415.
41 See, e.g., id. at 410 (describing the strong, centralist Sunnis as having
“grudgingly” accepted the reality of the Kurds’ “semi-independent” status).
42 Id. at 73.
43 Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1630–31.
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form semiautonomous regions.44 In other words, centralists call for
a form of asymmetric federalism, pursuant to which there is a single
Kurdish region, which alone enjoys substantial autonomy. I deal
with each of these criticisms in light of the relevant provisions
below, pointing out how particular constructions that make this
result clearly possible.
2.1.1. The Powers of the Provinces
In fact, the Iraqi Constitution does clearly distinguish between
provinces and regions, and grant considerably greater autonomy to
the regions. Article 121(2), for example, permits a region to limit
the applicability of national legislation,45 and no similar power is
given to a province. A region is explicitly given the right to enact a
constitution, and to exercise legislative, executive and judicial
powers in Articles 120 and 121(1),46 whereas a province is not. In
fact, while a province is supposed to enjoy “broad administrative
and financial authorities”, these are, under Article 122(2), to be
defined by a law enacted by the national legislature.47 These
provisions, it should be emphasized, were plainly negotiated by
centralist forces, as even the most ardent centralist would in all
likelihood not object strenuously to permitting some level of
administrative and financial decentralization, in a manner to be
determined by the national legislature.
The sole federalist concession respecting provinces, however,
creates rampant confusion. Specifically, Article 115 seems to grant
priority to provincial legislation over that of the national
legislature in the event of a conflict between them.48 The problem
is that, as described above, the provinces enjoy no constitutional power
to enact a local constitution, or to exercise legislative power pursuant
Al-Rahim Remarks, supra note 9; Istrabadi Remarks, supra note 10.
See Article 121 § 2, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (“It is a right for the power of a region, to modify the
implementation of a federal law in the region if there is exists a conflict or
contradiction as between it and the law of a region, as for matters that do not
intrude upon the exclusive competencies of the federal government.”) (author
translation).
46 Id. art. 120; 121 § 2.
47 Id. art. 122 § 2 (“[T]he provinces not formed into a region enjoy broad
administrative and financial authorities, so that they may organize their affairs in
accordance with the principle of decentralization, and this shall be organized by
law.”) (author translation).
44
45

48

Id. art. 115.
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thereto. To the contrary, the wide “administrative and financial
powers” they are supposed to exercise come to realization through
the enactment of national law, and precisely how national law can
define a power which could then used to supersede the very law
that gave rise to it is confounding and unworkable.
I offer no defense to this particular provision, no doubt meant
as a concession to federalists and designed to create the same type
of flexibility described above with respect to central government
jurisdiction or Islam and the state, but done in a far less satisfying
manner given the impossible contradiction. Gluck is quick to point
this out to demonstrate that the Constitution may be flexible, but it
is not well drafted nor is its flexibility due to wise design, foresight
or anything other than fortuitous happenstance. While I do not
agree, for reasons explored at length throughout this Essay, the
criticism has some force here. Suffice it to say, however, despite
the poor design, it is plain that any number of constructions might
arise from this rather perplexing arrangement, some of which favor
centralist visions for Iraq and some of which favor federalists.
2.1.2. Right of Provinces to Form Regions
Though a concern, the more divisive matter was not provincial
power, where, as noted above, the federalists granted broad
concessions with one area of confusion, but rather the creation of
regions beyond that of Iraqi Kurdistan. The concern was, again,
based in fact. ISCI had publicly announced the creation of a Shi’i
super-region before constitutional negotiations had come to an end.49
One of ISCI’s chief negotiators responsible for the section of the
constitution addressing provinces and regions called for the
complete removal of any references to provinces in the
constitution, because the state should be composed of a capital and
near-autonomous regions.50 The chief Kurdish negotiator for the
same section advanced the same proposition.51
This federalist aspiration was a centralist nightmare. The
provisions of the Constitution respecting broad regional
autonomy, to the extent they applied solely to the Kurdish region, were
for the most part uncontroversial, or at least met with grudging
acceptance.
To the extent they applied elsewhere, an
49
50
51

ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 408.
Constitutional Notes, supra note 32.
Id.
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insurmountable division arose. Such broader provisions were, for
the federalists, uncompromisingly essential, and for the centralists,
deeply objectionable, so much so that the most hardened
centralists, by and large the Arab Sunnis, abandoned the
negotiations rather than engage so much as the possibility of a
regionalized Iraq.52
In the end, the constitution offered what, to my mind, is the
only reasonable compromise that could have been achieved—
democratic decision-making on a province and province basis. The
process involved three steps. The first step was the enactment of a
law by Iraq’s legislature respecting the formation of regions.53 The
second step was that one third of the representatives of the
relevant provincial legislatures, or one tenth of the population of
the relevant provinces, needed to petition for a referendum to form
a region.54 Finally, a referendum would be held to decide the
matter for the relevant province or provinces.55
Admittedly, the process for regional formation was
comparatively simple. Supermajorities were not required; in fact,
only one third of the provincial legislature or one-tenth of the
relevant voting population would need to support the measure in
order to proceed to referendum. Nevertheless, the constitution did
not foreclose a relatively centralized state with a single federal
region (as the centralists wanted) or a highly federalized one with
three or more regions (as the federalists desired). Instead, it left the
matter to be determined by subsequent legal action or by a form of
post-enactment constitutional construction, to use Balkin’s term.
3.

FEDERALISM AS CONSTRUCTED

Notwithstanding the criticisms of the constitution from my
colleagues at the Penn Conference, it is clear that in post-enactment
constructions, the centralists have prevailed mightily in imposing
their construction of an asymmetrical federal state onto the

ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 409–11.
This step was a result of a phone call placed by President Bush to Shi’i
leader Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, urging the latter to offer more concessions to the
Sunni centralist forces. Robert H. Reid, Associated Press, Constitution Heading to
Parliament, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 27, 2005); see also Constitutional Notes, supra note
32 (demonstrating the concessions on the date following President Bush’s call).
54 Article 119, Dustour Jamhouriat al-Iraq [Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005.
55 Id.
52
53
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constitution’s framework text. They have been so successful that
the most centralist forces, the Arab Sunnis, originally disenchanted
with the Constitution, have come to accept and even promote it as
the fundamental bargain upon which the state is built. The Iraqiya
list, which enjoyed broad Sunni support in the March 2010
elections, has seen many of its leaders, Sunni and Shi’i, advance its
position that it had the right to form the government on the basis of
constitutional text.56 Far from decrying the Constitution, the chosen
representatives of the Sunni Arabs have defended and legitimized
it, and indeed accused their adversaries of violating it.57 The
reason for this broad acceptance, by the very forces that once voted
against the constitution, is clear.58 On every relevant question
regarding constitutional construction, the centralists have won.
Even more importantly for our purposes, they won by virtue of
having the benefit of a wisely drafted, sufficiently flexible, framework text
upon which they could establish their constructions.
The reason for this dramatic post election centralist triumph is
simple enough and draws on Friedman’s insights respecting the
primary agent of constitutional change: popular will.59 There was
simply no appetite for a federal Iraq among Iraq’s Shi’a population.
The regionalization effort was particularly telling. The national
legislature managed to pass a law permitting regional formation,
but just barely, with 140 representatives attending the vote, just
two above quorum, because of a large parliamentary boycott in
protest.60 Beyond this, the regionalization initiative proved to be

56 To provide a few representative examples, the leader of the Iraqiya list, the
secular Shi’i Ayad Allawi, described efforts designed to prevent him from first
opportunity to form a government as “a confiscation of the will of the Iraqi people
and our constitution. . . .” Ned Parkers, Ex-Premier Demands New Election In Iraq,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at A5. Another Iraqi leader, former Vice President and
leading Sunni Tariq al-Hashimi was reported in May of 2010 to have “restated”
the Iraqiya position that it be given the first opportunity to form the government,
pursuant to constitutional mandate. Stephen Lee Myers, Iraqi Politicians Break
Bread, But Not Their Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at A11. Finally, Hashimi
had earlier described his use of a presidential veto as necessary because required
by “the constitution and the principles of justice.” World Briefing: Iraq, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/16/world/fg-briefs16.S1.
57 Id.
58 ALLAWI, supra note 33, at 415–16.
59 FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 9.
60 Kirk Semple, In Victory for Shiite Leader, Iraqi Parliament Approves Creating
Autonomous Regions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2006, at A12; Amit R. Paley, Parliament
Approves Measure Allowing Autonomous Regions, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006
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an abject failure. An effort was made to gather petitions to allow
Basra to put the question of region formation on the ballot, on the
assumption that Basra was by far the most sympathetic to
federalist interests. The 10% threshold was not reached, even in
During this time,
this supposedly sympathetic province.61
federalist factions within the Shi’a base, most notably ISCI,
suffered dramatic electoral defeats to centralist forces, led by
current Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki, causing them to quietly
shelve their regionalization plans, seemingly abandoned by the
end of 2010.62
From this success, other constructions followed. As to the
matter of provinces, the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq in an
advisory opinion dealt with the incompatibility of Articles 115 and
122(2) by ignoring Article 115, emphasizing that the province has
no legislative capacity except that which the national government
chooses to give to it.63 This had the result of rendering national
law supreme over provincial law. Though the Court has hardly
held to any level of consistency in the matter,64 the legislature soon
thereafter enacted the Law of Provinces Not Formed into a Region,
No. 21 of 2008, in which national law supremacy is described in
quite certain terms through permitting the enactment of local law
on matters of administration and finance, but only to the extent that

(citing Qassim Abdul Zahra & Lee Keath, Iraq Parliament Passes Law to Allow
Setting Up Federal Regions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 12, 2006)).
61 Istrabadi, supra note 1, at 1631–32.
62 The results of the provincial elections held in April 2008 are available on a
variety of reputable and publicly available websites. See, e.g., Kholoud Ramzi,
Final Election Results, NIQASH: BRIEFINGS FROM INSIDE AND ACROSS IRAQ (Feb. 25,
2009), http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2395&lang=0
(providing election results for 14 of 18 provinces).
63 Federal Supreme Court (Iraq), Advisory Opinion 9 of 2007.
64 Around the same time that it issued advisory opinion 9, it also around the
same time issued another ruling, Decision No. 13 of 2007, which indicated
something of the opposite respecting lawmaking powers. The Provincial Council
of Basra, confused as to the Court’s position, asked for clarification respecting this
contrast, but referred to a conflict as between Decisions 13 and 16 rather than
Opinion 9 and Decision 13. Rather than provide any clarification to the Basra
Provincial Council and the balance of the Iraqi legal community, the Court only
pointed out in Decision 21 of 2010 that there was no conflict as between Decisions
13 and 16, thereby refusing the answer the question because of a mistaken cross
reference. Advisory Opinion 9 of 2007 has since been removed from the Iraq
Supreme Court’s website, as the case listings were reorganized, though clearly, as
the Basra example shows, the earlier opinion has not been forgotten.
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such local laws do not violate national law.65 Furthermore, while the
law grants substantial other authorities to the province, among
them the power to impeach an unpopular governor66 and to
remove Baghdad appointed high Ministry officials responsible for
the relevant province,67 it would be properly described more as
modest decentralization than the type of confederal arrangement
enjoyed by the Kurds.
Although the law remains a new one, it is constantly subject to
challenge and is a source of competition between center and state.
Interestingly, however, such conflict does not generally lie with
respect to the matter of conflicting laws and its national law
supremacy provisions.68 The provincial councils seem to have
accepted with some level of equanimity Baghdad’s supreme
authority as concerns such matters, and instead raise challenges on
issues such as the impeachment of governors or the means by
which they are elected.69 The disputes, that is to say, are well
within the orbit of those one would expect in a generally
centralized state enjoying modest decentralization.
Naturally, given the centralist successes, it should come as no
surprise that irrespective of what Al-Rahim, Istrabadi and
Galbraith have at varying times professed, the central government
does have powers beyond those set forth in Article 110. Praxis
bears out this conclusion; the national legislature has without
noticeable objection from any faction, including the federalist Kurds,
enacted legislation that lies well beyond the purview of Article 110 on
repeated occasions.
These include laws on nongovernmental

65 Law of Provinces Not Formed into a Region No. 21 of 2008 (Iraq), art. 2,
available at http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=227&id=2159
&lang=0.
66 Id. art. 8.
67 Id. art. 9.
68 Questions respecting reverse supremacy are raised sporadically before the
court. There is Decision 20 of 2010, respecting the applicability of national health
regulations. In addition, in Decision 6 of 2009, the provincial council of Babylon
asked whether or not reverse supremacy exists in Article 115 of the Constitution,
and the Court decided unhelpfully that it did. However, the number of such
cases is miniscule relative to the litigation concerning other aspects of the
Provinces Law.
69 See Federal Supreme Court (Iraq), Decision 58 of 2009 (upholding
provincial council dismissal of Salahuddin Province); see also Federal Supreme
Court (Iraq) Decision No. 20 of 2009; Federal Supreme Court (Iraq) Decision No.
24 of 2009; Federal Supreme Court (Iraq) Decision No. 35 of 2009 (dismissing all
questions regarding the election of governors for lack of jurisdiction).
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organizations,70 consumer protection,71 the environment,72 and
competition,73 to name but a few. The Council of Representatives
has even exercised the power to tax through amending a tax law.74
Having worked on some of these laws when produced by the
relevant committees, not once did I observe any sort of
jurisdictional objection respecting any one of them. Certainly
nothing that the Federal Supreme Court has issued has ever
suggested that these laws are unconstitutional because beyond the
jurisdiction of the central government. The matter, it seems, is
settled rather conclusively for the moment; and, attendant concerns
about the national government’s power to tax, or exercise other
competencies beyond those set forth in Article 110, seem
misplaced.
4.

ON THE PROBLEM OF FORMAL AMENDMENT

In light of the resolutions reached above, the criticisms of my
colleagues to the constitution appear particularly confounding in
some ways. Why does it matter that the central government’s
power to tax is capable of alternative constructions from the
framework text, if the one broadly adopted without controversy is
the one that gives the central government such power? What
danger will materialize if there is a dissolution of province from
center via Article 115 under circumstances where one branch of
government, the judiciary, has declared that provision effectively
meaningless as against the provinces (at least on occasion), and
another branch, the legislature, has enacted legislation to that
effect, which legislation has received broad acceptance in province
and center alike? Is it not clear from the dismal failure to gather
the support of even 10% of Basra’s voting population that the
efforts at regionalization have been abandoned? Or, put more
broadly into a single question, why must we talk about the
constitution being the source of national dissolution when every
conceivable construction of the constitution’s framework text has been
established in precisely the opposite direction?

70
71
72
73
74

Law on Nongovernmental Organizations, No. 12 of 2010 (Iraq).
Consumer Protection Law, No. 1 of 2010 (Iraq).
Protection of Wild Animals Law, No. 17 of 2010 (Iraq).
Competition Law, No. 14 of 2010 (Iraq).
Law Amending the Property Tax Law No. 162 of 1959, No. 1 of 2009 (Iraq).
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I am perfectly happy to concede that Iraq’s constitution could
have been constructed in a fashion that would have made Iraq a
very loose confederation of semi-independent regions with little
uniting them beyond geographic proximity. There is no doubt that
this could have led ultimately to national dissolution, a point that
Gluck emphasizes and I accept as correct. I am further happy to
concede that it is at least possible that some political forces more
powerful during drafting than at present might have found such a
result satisfying. None of that changes the fact that current social
and political realities have layered onto the constitution an
alternative construction, one far more centralist in character,
rendering such dangers exceedingly remote. Why then the
concern?
Several possibilities present themselves. The first, and most
likely, is some form of reflexive formalism. That is, figures as
intelligent and deeply involved in Iraq as Istrabadi and Al-Rahim
are aware of the considerable changes that have taken place in Iraq
since the adoption of the Constitution in 2005. As a result, we
would likely not debate long on the reality of those changes. But
one more enamored of formalism, perhaps more reflexively than as
a chosen intellectual position, would not dismiss as readily as I
have the milieu in which the constitution was drafted, by which I
mean they would pay much less attention to subsequent construction
and interpretation than I might. I can only characterize this as a
mistake, one that if applied in the American context could lead one
to worry about the possibility of segregation,75 the permissibility of
social security and a prohibition on paper money.76 Needless to
75 General scholarly consensus is that explicit racial segregation was not
considered to be objectionable by the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (“Even a judge who believes that abstract justice requires
economic equality cannot interpret the equal protection clause as making equality
of wealth or collective ownership of productive resources . . . .”); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 728
(1988) (“[T]he argument that the framers had two relevant and contradictory sets
of intentions lacks any historical foundation.”); but see Michael McConnell, The
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1997) (“[T]he principle
of equality in the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘something more robust’ than the
requirement that laws be enforced in accordance with their terms.”).
76 See John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 803, 836 (2009) (pointing out that the authority to
enact social security or issue paper money under the U.S. Constitution is subject to
challenge).
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say, I know very few American lawyers or political actors so
concerned that such rulings are imminent.
A second possible objection relates to some form of an aesthetic
preference. If the Iraqi central government has the power to tax,
that is, then it simply seems to be better technical drafting, and
more satisfying, to see this reflected clearly and without ambiguity
in the text. This is not necessarily because consequences attach, but
because good writing is clear, and the constitution on such matters
is anything but. I cannot imagine any one of my colleagues
adhering to such a preposterous position and so, to be absolutely
clear, I do not ascribe it to them. Nonetheless, as I think others
might raise such matters, I dispense with it readily enough. As
Ackerman and Nou have pointed out, any constitutional lawyer
knows that formal amendment is the avenue by which
constitutional meaning is changed only when no other options
present themselves.77 Amendment is costly, cumbersome and
difficult to achieve. It engenders resistance, and it opens wounds
previously sealed by consensual text. It raises the possibility of
profound, lasting and dangerous disagreement on core matters.
The notion that such a daunting undertaking should be initiated
for no reason other than that the product looks better that way is
utterly misguided.
Finally, and this much wiser objection I can well attribute to AlRahim and Gluck, who raised the matter in the Penn Conference,
there is the concern of future reversal. It is true, Al-Rahim and
Gluck both indicated in their objections to my presentation, that to
date, the provinces have shown no desire to regionalize. There is
no guarantee, however, that at some point they will decide they
have had enough of Baghdad’s incompetence and seek
regionalization. Only formal amendment could prevent such a
process.
This is the most salient reason to seek formal amendment,
albeit insufficient. Here, my colleagues would certainly be correct
to criticize any attempted comparison on my part to the American
context as facile, as plainly the possibility of America reinstituting
segregation given the long, painful history of the civil rights
movement is exceedingly remote and cannot credibly be compared
to a reconsideration of central government powers in Iraq
respecting tax, for example. To do so would be to trivialize the
Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 67 (2009)
77
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civil rights movement and its enormous social and political
achievements.
As such, I will refrain from making such
comparisons.
I will say, however, that to the extent that more federalist
conceptions were at one point earlier in Iraq’s very young
constitutional history possible, or even likely, they are considerably
less so today. Constructions have staying power. The actors who
have adopted them have grown comfortable with them, and
wholesale abandonment will not be undertaken lightly even
though adjustments will certainly be made as time goes on (in
particular, over the nature and scope of the administrative and
financial decentralization granted to the provinces under the Law
of Provinces). This is particularly because any such change will
require significant shifts in attitudes among the Arab population to
the very state they imagine Iraq to be: a centralized Arab one with
a proud history that is prominent and an important part of the
broader region.
I do not mean to suggest that the matter of regionalization is
impossible. I suppose Al-Rahim is correct that regionalization and
confederalization is possible, though to my mind, it would require
much more than prolonged central incompetence on the part of
Baghdad. It would require an accompanying disenchantment with Iraq
as nation such that Iraq’s Arab citizens look upon themselves as
being from the people of Basra, Mosul, or Nasiriya rather than Iraq.
In addition, I imagine that such an important change in attitudes
and preconceptions would require a set of circumstances so dire
that, to my mind, the constitutional flexibility enabling this would
be a matter to be welcomed. I cannot see what is gained by
insisting that Basra follow Baghdad’s dictate under (hypothetical)
circumstances where Baghdad has underfunded Basra and, more
importantly, Basra’s citizens no longer view the very conception of
Iraq with any sort of deep affinity, in a manner characteristic
perhaps of Iraq’s Kurds. Such rigidity under such circumstances, it
seems, would only lead to the constitution’s premature death, if
the trends highlighted by Melton, Elkins and Ginsburg78 are
sustained in the Iraqi context.

See discussion and sources cited supra note 21 (respecting endurance of
national constitutions when sufficiently flexible).
78
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CONCLUSION

I have related the dispute between my colleagues and me in
rather Manichean terms, and I hope that I have not
mischaracterized their valuable opinions or reduced them to
caricature in doing so. In the interests of ensuring that no such
mistake was made, this conclusion offers me an opportunity to
qualify my above remarks, and perhaps walk back my claims to
the extent that they have been overstated.
While I do not share the view that there is no formalist-realist
divide in our academy, I would certainly concede that the
respective positions are made to appear more extreme than they in
fact are. To that end, I should make clear that I know that my
colleagues do not deny the possibility of constitutional construction,
nor do they necessarily demand absolute clarity in constitutional
language. Gluck in particular has made clear that flexibility at
times is desirable and can be made to work. Similarly, while I have
emphasized post-enactment construction, my embrace of Balkin’s
originalist model should, I believe, make rather clear to the casual
reader that the words of the constitution as originally drafted mean
something. To return to my earlier example respecting Islam and
the state, the constitutional language, while being flexible, does not
support the vesting of any sort of political authority in a jurist
determined by whatever process to be Supreme Leader. The
notion that language may be capacious so as to address evolving
social, political and economic needs is not equivalent to saying that
language may mean anything.
In the end, our disagreement is perhaps less about category
than about extent—that is, they feel, perhaps to differing extents,
that the constitution offers too much flexibility, that its formal
language is insufficiently constraining, that post ratification
constructions, while undeniable, are not strong enough to overcome
what they view as textual flaws and, in Gluck’s case, severe
problems in design caused by hasty drafting. Needless to say, as I
have outlined at some length, while I would not advance the
notion that the constitution is by any means flawless, in general its
flexibility is salutary, and has been proven so by post ratification
events and constructions. Our exchange at the Penn Conference
was fruitful, and extraordinarily edifying as a result. I will not
deny that it has allowed me to better defend some of my positions,
and reconsider and adjust others in the favor of formal text. I can
only hope that I might have been able to do the same for my
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valued colleagues. More importantly than this, I hope that this will
not be our last opportunity for engagement on this matter.
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